| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w10978 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 10978 |
| Theft and Taxes | |
| Mihir A. Desai; Alexander Dyck; Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2004-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the characteristics of a taxation system affect the extraction of private benefits by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance outcomes. In contrast, stronger tax enforcement reduces diversion and, in so doing, can raise the stock market value of a company in spite of the increase in the tax burden. We also show that the corporate governance system affects the level of tax revenues and the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. When the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income), an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues. We test this prediction in a panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have smaller (in fact, negative) effects on revenues when corporate governance is weaker. Finally, this approach provides a novel justification for the existence of a separate corporate tax based on profits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w10978 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568612 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mihir A. Desai,Alexander Dyck,Luigi Zingales. Theft and Taxes. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w10978.pdf（640KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
