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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w11006
来源IDWorking Paper 11006
Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition
Mark J. Garmaise; Tobias J. Moskowitz
发表日期2004-12-20
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide microlevel (within-county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experienced more bank mergers are subjected to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.
主题Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w11006
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568641
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Mark J. Garmaise,Tobias J. Moskowitz. Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition. 2004.
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