全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11030
来源ID	Working Paper 11030
	Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets
	Marco Bassetto; Thomas Sargent
发表日期	2005-01-10
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze the democratic politics of a rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows the government to issue debt to finance capital items only. Many national governments followed this rule in the 18th and 19th centuries and most U.S. states do today. This simple 1800s financing rule sometimes provides excellent incentives for majorities to choose an efficient mix of public goods in an economy with a growing population of overlapping generations of long-lived but mortal agents. In a special limiting case with demographics that make Ricardian equivalence prevail, the 1800s rule does nothing to promote efficiency. But when the demographics imply even a moderate departure from Ricardian equivalence, imposing the rule substantially improves the efficiency of democratically chosen allocations. We calibrate some examples to U.S. demographic data. We speculate why in the twentieth century most national governments abandoned the 1800s rule while U.S. state governments have retained it.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Subnational Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11030
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568665
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marco Bassetto,Thomas Sargent. Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets. 2005.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w11030.pdf（638KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览