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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w11052
来源IDWorking Paper 11052
How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans
Jun Qian; Philip E. Strahan
发表日期2005-01-17
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We examine empirically how legal origin, creditor rights, property rights, legal formalism, and financial development affect the design of price and non-price terms of bank loans in almost 60 countries. Our results support the law and finance view that private contracts reflect differences in legal protection of creditors and the enforcement of contracts. Loans made to borrowers in countries where creditors can seize collateral in case of default are more likely to be secured, have longer maturity, and have lower interest rates. We also find evidence, however, that ?Coasian? bargaining can partially offset weak legal or institutional arrangements. For example, lenders mitigate risks associated with weak property rights and government corruption by securing loans with collateral and shortening maturity. Our results also suggest that the choice of loan ownership structure affects loan contract terms.
主题Other ; Law and Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Development and Growth ; Country Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w11052
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568687
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Jun Qian,Philip E. Strahan. How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans. 2005.
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