| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w11052
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 11052
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| How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans |
| Jun Qian; Philip E. Strahan
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| 发表日期 | 2005-01-17
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| 出版年 | 2005
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We examine empirically how legal origin, creditor rights, property rights, legal formalism, and financial development affect the design of price and non-price terms of bank loans in almost 60 countries. Our results support the law and finance view that private contracts reflect differences in legal protection of creditors and the enforcement of contracts. Loans made to borrowers in countries where creditors can seize collateral in case of default are more likely to be secured, have longer maturity, and have lower interest rates. We also find evidence, however, that ?Coasian? bargaining can partially offset weak legal or institutional arrangements. For example, lenders mitigate risks associated with weak property rights and government corruption by securing loans with collateral and shortening maturity. Our results also suggest that the choice of loan ownership structure affects loan contract terms. |
| 主题 | Other
; Law and Economics
; Financial Economics
; Financial Institutions
; Development and Growth
; Country Studies
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11052
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568687
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jun Qian,Philip E. Strahan. How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans. 2005.
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文件名：
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w11052.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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