| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11074 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11074 |
| Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions | |
| Gabriel D. Carroll; James J. Choi; David Laibson; Brigitte Madrian; Andrew Metrick | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Defaults can have a dramatic influence on consumer decisions. We identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults: requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves. We study such "active decisions" in the context of 401(k) saving. We find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401(k) enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt-in enrollment procedure, producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take three years to achieve under standard enrollment. We also present a model of 401(k) enrollment and characterize the optimal enrollment regime. Active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences that are highly heterogeneous. Naive beliefs about future time-inconsistency strengthen the normative appeal of the active-decision enrollment regime. However, financial illiteracy favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11074 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568709 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gabriel D. Carroll,James J. Choi,David Laibson,et al. Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11074.pdf（592KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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