| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11082 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11082 |
| A Theory of Takeovers and Disinvestment | |
| Bart Lambrecht; Stewart C. Myers | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a real-options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product demand declines, a first-best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by shutting down the .rm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of unlevered firms always abandon the firm's business too late. We model the managers' payout policy absent takeovers and consider the effects of golden parachutes and leverage on managers' shut-down decisions. We analyze the effects of takeovers of under-leveraged firms. Takeovers by raiders enforce first-best closure. Hostile takeovers by other firms occur either at the first-best closure point or too early. We also consider management buyouts and mergers of equals and show that in both cases closure happens inefficiently late. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11082 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568717 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bart Lambrecht,Stewart C. Myers. A Theory of Takeovers and Disinvestment. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11082.pdf（438KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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