| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11128 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11128 |
| Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts | |
| Marie Thursby; Jerry Thursby; Emmanuel Dechenaux | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists. Our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard, risk sharing, and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed. Milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties. The potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional, but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it. Whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm. This supports the rationale for Bayh-Dole march-in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11128 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marie Thursby,Jerry Thursby,Emmanuel Dechenaux. Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11128.pdf（282KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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