全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Investment Timing, Agency, and Information

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11148
来源ID	Working Paper 11148
	Investment Timing, Agency, and Information
	Steven R. Grenadier; Neng Wang
发表日期	2005-02-21
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, greater inertia occurs in investment, as the model predicts that the manager will have a more valuable option to wait than the owner.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Monetary Policy
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11148
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568785
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Steven R. Grenadier,Neng Wang. Investment Timing, Agency, and Information. 2005.