| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11156 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11156 |
| The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis | |
| Benjamin Chiao; Josh Lerner; Jean Tirole | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper empirically explores the procedures employed by standard-setting organizations. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2004), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and when there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11156 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568793 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin Chiao,Josh Lerner,Jean Tirole. The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11156.pdf（283KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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