| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11227 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11227 |
| A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Daniel L. Rubinfeld | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in which damages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine. We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between cash and coupons to purchase units of the defendant's product at a discount -- a "coupon-cash remedy" -- is superior to cash alone. The optimal coupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than the value of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively high harm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons, and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash. Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence because the costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the cost of providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms that they have caused. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11227 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568864 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Daniel L. Rubinfeld. A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11227.pdf（259KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
