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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w11241 |
来源ID | Working Paper 11241 |
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value | |
Mihir A. Desai; Dhammika Dharmapala | |
发表日期 | 2005-04-04 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | How do investors value managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations? Using a framework in which managers' tax sheltering decisions are related to their ability to divert value, this paper predicts that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value should vary systematically with the strength of firm governance institutions. The empirical results indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero; however, the effect is positive for well-governed firms as predicted. Coefficient estimates are consistent with an expected life of five years for the devices that generate these tax savings for well-governed firms. Alternative explanations for the dependence of the valuation of the tax avoidance measure on firm governance do not appear to be consistent with the empirical results. The findings indicate that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete, given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11241 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568878 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mihir A. Desai,Dhammika Dharmapala. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w11241.pdf(254KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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