| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11245 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11245 |
| The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain | |
| Robert E. Hall; Paul R. Milgrom | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-04 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When a job-seeker and an employer meet, find a prospective surplus, and bargain over the wage, conditions in the outside labor market, including especially unemployment, may be irrelevant. The job-seeker's threat point in the bargain is to delay bargaining, not to terminate bargaining and resume search at other employers. Similarly, the employer's threat point is to delay bargaining, not to terminate it. Consequently, the outcome of the bargain depends on the relative costs of delay to the parties, not on the results of irrational threats to disclaim any bargain. In a model of the labor market that otherwise adopts all of the features of the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model, unemployment is much more sensitive to changes in productivity than in the standard model, because feedback through the wage is absent. We also present models where the wage bargain is in partial contact with conditions in the labor market. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Business Cycles ; Labor Economics ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11245 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568882 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert E. Hall,Paul R. Milgrom. The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11245.pdf（157KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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