| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11254 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11254 |
| When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance | |
| Olubunmi Faleye; Vikas Mehrotra; Randall Morck | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-04 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly-traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. We therefore propose that labor uses its corporate governance voice to maximize the combined value of its contractual and residual claims, and that this often pushes corporate policies away from, rather than towards, shareholder value maximization. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11254 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568891 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Olubunmi Faleye,Vikas Mehrotra,Randall Morck. When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11254.pdf（219KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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