| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11273 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11273 |
| Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil | |
| Lee J. Alston; Bernardo Mueller | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-04-18 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 gave relatively strong powers to the President. We model and test Executive-Legislative relations in Brazil and demonstrate that Presidents have used pork as a political currency to exchange for votes on policy reforms. In particular Presidents Cardoso and Lula have used pork to exchange for amendments to the Constitution. Without policy reforms Brazil would have had greater difficulty meeting their debt obligations. The logic for the exchange of pork for policy reform is that Presidents typically have greater electoral incentives than members of Congress to care about economic growth, economic opportunity, income equality and price stabilization. Members of Congress generally care more about redistributing gains to their constituents. Given the differences in preferences and the relative powers of each, the Legislative and Executive benefit by exploiting the gains from trade. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11273 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568910 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lee J. Alston,Bernardo Mueller. Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11273.pdf（226KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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