| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11317 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11317 |
| Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation | |
| Matias Iaryczower; Pablo Spiller; Mariano Tommasi | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-05-09 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11317 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/568956 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matias Iaryczower,Pablo Spiller,Mariano Tommasi. Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11317.pdf（375KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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