| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11371 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11371 |
| Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy | |
| Kishore Gawande; Pravin Krishna; Marcelo Olarreaga | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well-known Grossman-Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified suitably to account for the cross-sectoral use of inputs in production (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis. Our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the"welfare-mindedness" of governments in setting trade policy. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11371 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569010 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kishore Gawande,Pravin Krishna,Marcelo Olarreaga. Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11371.pdf（217KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
