| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11397 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11397 |
| Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era | |
| John Joseph Wallis; Barry R. Weingast | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why did states dominate investments in economic development in early America? Between 1787 and 1860, the national government%u2019s $54 million on promoting transportation infrastructure while the states spent $450 million. Using models of legislative choice, we show that Congress could not finance projects that provided benefits to a minority of districts while spreading the taxes over all. Although states faced the same political problems, they used benefit taxation schemes -- for example, by assessing property taxes on the basis of the expected increase in value due to an infrastructure investment. The U.S. Constitution prohibited the federal government from using benefit taxation. Moreover, the federal government%u2019s expenditures were concentrated in collections small projects -- such as lighthouses and rivers and harbors -- that spent money in all districts. Federal inaction was the result of the equilibrium political forces in Congress, and hence an equilibrium impotence. |
| 主题 | History ; Other History ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11397 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569038 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Joseph Wallis,Barry R. Weingast. Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11397.pdf（318KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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