| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11402 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11402 |
| Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market | |
| Alvin E. Roth; Tayfun Sonmez; M. Utku Unver | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-06-13 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients. Larger than 3-way exchanges have much smaller impact. Larger populations of patient-donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Mathematical Tools |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11402 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569043 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alvin E. Roth,Tayfun Sonmez,M. Utku Unver. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11402.pdf（341KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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