| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11498 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11498 |
| Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending | |
| Thorsten Beck; Asli Demirguc-Kunt; Ross Levine | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Which commercial bank supervisory policies ease - or intensify - the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance? Based on new data from more than 2,500 firms across 37 countries, this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms%u2019 financing obstacles. We find that the traditional approach to bank supervision, which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to directly monitor, discipline, and influence banks, does not improve the integrity of bank lending. Rather, we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance. In extensions, we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11498 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569142 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thorsten Beck,Asli Demirguc-Kunt,Ross Levine. Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11498.pdf（364KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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