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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w11500 |
来源ID | Working Paper 11500 |
Bank Concentration and Fragility: Impact and Mechanics | |
Thorsten Beck; Asli Demirguc-Kunt; Ross Levine | |
发表日期 | 2005-08-01 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Public policy debates and theoretical disputes motivate this paper's examination of (i) the relationship between bank concentration and banking system fragility and (ii) the mechanisms underlying this relationship. We find no support for the view that concentration increases the fragility of banks. Rather, banking system concentration is associated with a lower probability that the country suffers a systemic banking crisis. In terms of policies, we find that (i) regulations and institutions that facilitate competition in banking are associated with less—not more—banking system fragility and (ii) including these policy indicators does not change the results on concentration. This suggests that concentration is a proxy for something else besides the competitive environment. Also, we do not find that official capital regulations, reserve requirements, or official prudential regulations lower crises probabilities. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that concentrated banking systems tend to have larger, better-diversified banks, which may help account for the positive link between concentration and stability. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11500 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569144 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thorsten Beck,Asli Demirguc-Kunt,Ross Levine. Bank Concentration and Fragility: Impact and Mechanics. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w11500.pdf(350KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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