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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w11505 |
来源ID | Working Paper 11505 |
Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership | |
Jean Helwege; Christo Pirinsky; René M. Stulz | |
发表日期 | 2005-08-01 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We consider IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 and examine the evolution of their insider ownership over time to understand better why and how U.S. firms that become widely held do so. In our sample, a majority of firms has insider ownership below 20% after ten years. We find that a firm's stock market performance and trading play an extremely important role in its insider ownership dynamics. Firms that experience large decreases in insider ownership and/or become widely held are firms with high valuations, good recent stock market performance, and liquid markets for their stocks. In contrast and surprisingly, variables suggested by agency theory have limited success in explaining the evolution of insider ownership. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Microeconomics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11505 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569149 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Helwege,Christo Pirinsky,René M. Stulz. Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w11505.pdf(246KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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