| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w11532
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11532
|
| Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products |
| Yooki Park; Suzanne Scotchmer
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-08-08
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | As it becomes cheaper to copy and share digital content, vendors are turning to technical protections such as encryption. We argue that if protection is nevertheless imperfect, this transition will generally lower the prices of content relative to perfect legal enforcement. However, the effect on prices depends on whether the content providers use independent protection standards or a shared one, and if shared, on the governance of the system. Even if a shared system permits content providers to set their prices independently, the equilibrium prices will depend on how the vendors share the costs. We show that demand-based cost sharing generally leads to higher prices than revenue-based cost sharing. Users, vendors and the antitrust authorities will typically have different views on what capabilities the DRM system should have. We argue that, when a DRM system is implemented as an industry standard, there is a potential for "collusion through technology." |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
; Market Structure and Firm Performance
; Other
; Law and Economics
; Development and Growth
; Innovation and R&
; D
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11532
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569177
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Yooki Park,Suzanne Scotchmer. Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products. 2005.
|
|
文件名：
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w11532.pdf
|
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
|
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