全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11535
来源ID	Working Paper 11535
	Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
	Roland Bénabou; Jean Tirole
发表日期	2005-08-08
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Other ; Culture
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11535
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569179
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Roland Bénabou,Jean Tirole. Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. 2005.