| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w11570
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 11570
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| Diversity and Redistribution |
| Raquel Fernández; Gilat Levy
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| 发表日期 | 2005-08-22
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| 出版年 | 2005
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper examines how preference heterogeneity affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by plurality. Political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible (in that they belong to the Pareto set of their members). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive tax which is lumpsum rebated and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific (targeted) goods. We show that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests. When the degree of taste diversity is low, the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers. As taste diversity increases in society, the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution. As diversity increases further, however, only general redistribution survives. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Market Structure and Distribution
; Welfare and Collective Choice
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11570
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569214
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Raquel Fernández,Gilat Levy. Diversity and Redistribution. 2005.
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文件名：
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w11570.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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