| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11624 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11624 |
| Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance | |
| Zsuzsanna Fluck; Kedran Garrison; Stewart C. Myers | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-19 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and hold-up problems. We explore several financing scenarios, including first-best, monopolistic, syndicated and fully competitive financing. We solve numerically for the entrepreneur's effort, the terms of financing, the venture capitalist's investment decision and NPV. We find significant value losses due to holdup problems and under-provision of effort that can outweigh the benefits of staged financing and investment. We show that a commitment to later-stage syndicate financing increases effort and NPV and preserves the option value of staged investment. This commitment benefits initial venture capital investors as well as the entrepreneur. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11624 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569269 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zsuzsanna Fluck,Kedran Garrison,Stewart C. Myers. Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11624.pdf（709KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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