| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11674 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11674 |
| Minorities and Storable Votes | |
| Alessandra Casella; Thomas Palfrey; Raymond Riezman | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-03 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desidered over a series of binary decisions. By cumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only of its strength of preferences is high and the majority's strength of preferences is low. The result is that aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11674 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569320 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Thomas Palfrey,Raymond Riezman. Minorities and Storable Votes. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11674.pdf（1495KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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