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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w11716 |
来源ID | Working Paper 11716 |
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements | |
Giovanni Maggi; Andres Rodriguez-Clare | |
发表日期 | 2005-10-24 |
出版年 | 2005 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper presents a theory of trade agreements where "politics" play an central role. This stands in contrast with the standard theory, where even politically-motivated governments sign trade agreements only to deal with terms-of-trade externalities. We develop a model where governments may be motivated to sign a trade agreement both by the presence of standard terms-of-trade externalities and by the desire to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. The model is rich in implications. In particular, it predicts that trade agreements result in deeper trade liberalization when governments are more politically motivated (provided capital mobility is sufficiently high) and when capital can move more freely across sectors. Also, governments tend to prefer a commitment in the form of tariff ceilings rather than exact tariff levels. In a fully dynamic specification of the model, trade liberalization occurs in two stages: an immediate slashing of tariffs and a subsequent gradual reduction of tariffs. The immediate tariff cut is a reflection of the terms-of-trade motive for the agreement, while the domestic-commitment motive is reflected in the gradual phase of trade liberalization. Finally, the speed of trade liberalization is higher when capital is more mobile across sectors. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Trade |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11716 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569366 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Maggi,Andres Rodriguez-Clare. A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements. 2005. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w11716.pdf(377KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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