| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11720 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11720 |
| Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility | |
| Stephen Calabrese; Dennis Epple; Thomas Romer; Holger Sieg | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects. We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process. We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data. We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11720 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569371 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Calabrese,Dennis Epple,Thomas Romer,et al. Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11720.pdf（369KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
