| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11738 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11738 |
| Debiasing through Law | |
| Christine Jolls; Cass R. Sunstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-07 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many settings, human beings are boundedly rational. A distinctive and insufficiently explored legal response to bounded rationality is to attempt to "debias through law," by steering people in more rational directions. In many important domains, existing legal analyses emphasize the alternative approach of insulating outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior, often through blocking private choices. In fact, however, a large number of actual and imaginable legal strategies are efforts to engage in the very different approach of debiasing through law by reducing or even eliminating people's boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts to debias through law can avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with regulatory approaches that take bounded rationality as a given and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects. This paper offers a general account of how debiasing through law does or could work to address legal questions across a range of areas, from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Discussion is also devoted to the risks of government manipulation and overshooting that are sometimes raised when debiasing through law is employed. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11738 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569388 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christine Jolls,Cass R. Sunstein. Debiasing through Law. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11738.pdf（274KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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