| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11765 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11765 |
| Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords | |
| Benjamin Edelman; Michael Ostrovsky; Michael Schwarz | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-14 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the "generalized second price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism which is used by search engines to sell online advertising that most Internet users encounter daily. GSP is tailored to its unique environment, and neither the mechanism nor the environment have previously been studied in the mechanism design literature. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. In particular, unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP in a dynamic environment, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to the GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium that results in the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11765 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569416 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin Edelman,Michael Ostrovsky,Michael Schwarz. Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11765.pdf（291KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
