全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights: The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11772
来源ID	Working Paper 11772
	The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights: The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization
	Karla Hoff; Joseph E. Stiglitz
发表日期	2005-11-14
出版年	2005
语种	英语
摘要	How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. We show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers.
主题	Other ; Law and Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11772
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569423
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Karla Hoff,Joseph E. Stiglitz. The Creation of the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Property Rights: The Political and Economic Consequences of a Corrupt Privatization. 2005.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w11772.pdf（317KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览