| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11780 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11780 |
| The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-21 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law %u2013 the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction be adjusted? How much of society%u2019s resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including: activity level; errors; the costs of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship; settlements; self-reporting; repeat offenders; imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness of sanctions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11780 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569431 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Steven Shavell. The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11780.pdf（999KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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