| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w11786
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11786
|
| Pay Inequality, Pay Secrecy, and Effort: Theory and Evidence |
| Gary Charness; Peter Kuhn
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-21
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study worker and firm behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers' wages may potentially influence a worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers' responsiveness to co-workers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress wages under quite general conditions. Our laboratory experiments, on the other hand, show that --while workers' effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages-- effort is not affected by co-workers' wages. As a consequence, even though firms in our experiment tended to compress wages when wages became public information, this did not raise their profits. Our experimental evidence therefore provides little support for the notion that inter-worker equity concerns can make wage compression, or wage secrecy, a profit-maximizing policy. |
| 主题 | Econometrics
; Experimental Design
; Labor Economics
; Labor Market Structures
; Other
; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11786
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569437
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gary Charness,Peter Kuhn. Pay Inequality, Pay Secrecy, and Effort: Theory and Evidence. 2005.
|
|
文件名：
|
w11786.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
