| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11872 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11872 |
| Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers | |
| Lingxin Hao; V. Joseph Hotz; Ginger Z. Jin | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. We consider parental reputation in a repeated two-stage game in which adolescents decide whether to give a teen birth or drop out of high school, and given adolescent decisions, the parent decides whether to house and support his children beyond age 18. Drawing on the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that the parent has, under certain conditions, the incentive to penalize older children for their teenage risky behaviors in order to dissuade the younger children from the same risky behaviors. The model generates two empirical implications: the likelihood of teen risky behaviors and parental transfers to a child who engaged in teen risky behaviors will decrease with the number of remaining children at risk. We test these two implications, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79). Exploiting the availability of repeated observations on individual respondents and of observations on multiple siblings, we find evidence in favor of both predictions. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11872 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569523 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lingxin Hao,V. Joseph Hotz,Ginger Z. Jin. Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11872.pdf（245KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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