| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w11914 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 11914 |
| Financial Expertise of Directors | |
| A. Burak Güner; Ulrike Malmendier; Geoffrey Tate | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-09 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The composition and functioning of corporate boards is at the core of the academic and policy debate on optimal corporate governance. But does board composition matter for corporate decisions? In this paper, we analyze the role of financial experts on boards. In a novel panel data set on board composition, we find that financial experts significantly affect corporate decisions, though not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. First, when commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity diminishes. But, the increased financing affects mostly firms with good credit and poor investment opportunities. Second, investment bankers on the board are associated with larger bond issues, but also worse acquisitions. Third, we find little evidence that financial expertise matters for compensation policy or for experts without affiliation to a financial institution. The results suggest a tradeoff between outside incentives (e.g. bank profits) and the incentive to maximize firm value. Requiring financial expertise on boards, as mandated by regulatory proposals, may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests are neglected. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w11914 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569565 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Burak Güner,Ulrike Malmendier,Geoffrey Tate. Financial Expertise of Directors. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w11914.pdf（304KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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