全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): When to Start a Fight and When to Fight Back: Liability Disputes in the Workers' Compensation System

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来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11918
来源ID	Working Paper 11918
	When to Start a Fight and When to Fight Back: Liability Disputes in the Workers' Compensation System
	David Card; Brian P. McCall
发表日期	2006-01-09
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	Despite the adoption of no-fault Workers' Compensation legislation in most states, there is substantial litigation over the issue of employer liability for injury claims. We develop a sequential asymmetric information model of liability disputes and estimate the model using data on injury claims from the state of Minnesota. The key insight of our model is that when workers differ in their costs of pursuing a injury claim, employers have an incentive to deny liability and force those with higher costs to abandon their claim. Likewise, workers who expect a bigger return from pursuing their claim are more likely to fight back when liability is denied. Estimates of the structural model confirm that the decision rules of both parties depend on the expected costs and benefits of continuing the dispute. The model provides a parsimonious but relatively successful explanation for the distribution of liability disputes across different workers and types of injuries.
主题	Other ; Law and Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11918
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569569
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	David Card,Brian P. McCall. When to Start a Fight and When to Fight Back: Liability Disputes in the Workers' Compensation System. 2006.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w11918.pdf（326KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览