全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w11965
来源ID	Working Paper 11965
	Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
	Atila Abdulkadiroglu; Parag Pathak; Alvin E. Roth; Tayfun Sonmez
发表日期	2006-01-23
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	In July 2005 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices facing parents. This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston mechanism, a priority matching mechanism, and the case in favor of the change to a strategy-proof mechanism. Using detailed records on student choices and assignments, we present evidence both of sophisticated strategic behavior among some parents, and of unsophisticated strategic behavior by others. We find evidence that some parents pay close attention to the capacity constraints of different schools, while others appear not to. In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current mechanism. This interaction between sophisticated and unsophisticated players identifies a new rationale for strategy-proof mechanisms based on fairness, and was a critical argument in Boston's decision to change the mechanism. We then discuss the considerations that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the (also strategy-proof) top trading cycles mechanism.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w11965
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569616
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Atila Abdulkadiroglu,Parag Pathak,Alvin E. Roth,et al. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. 2006.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w11965.pdf（1194KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览