| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w12008
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 12008
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| Perverse Incentives in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit |
| David McAdams; Michael Schwarz
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| 发表日期 | 2006-02-06
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We analyze some of the perverse incentives that may arise under the current Medicare prescription drug benefit design. In particular, risk adjustment for a stand-alone prescription drug benefit creates perverse incentives for prescription drug plans' coverage decisions and/or pharmaceutical companies' pricing decisions. This problem is new in that it does not arise with risk adjustment for other types of health care coverage. For this and other reasons, Medicare's drug benefit requires especially close regulatory oversight, now and in the future. We also consider a relatively minor change in how the benefit is financed that could lead to significant changes in how it functions. In particular, if all plans were required to charge the same premium, there would be less diversity in quality but also less budgetary uncertainty and less upward pressure on drug prices. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare
; Health
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12008
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569659
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
David McAdams,Michael Schwarz. Perverse Incentives in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit. 2006.
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文件名：
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w12008.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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