| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12049 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12049 |
| Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms | |
| Alberto Alesina; Silvia Ardagna; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12049 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569702 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Silvia Ardagna,Francesco Trebbi. Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12049.pdf（372KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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