G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w12049
来源IDWorking Paper 12049
Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms
Alberto Alesina; Silvia Ardagna; Francesco Trebbi
发表日期2006-02-20
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要Why do countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation? And what explains the timing of reforms? We use the war of attrition model as a guidance for our empirical study on a vast sample of countries. We find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The role of external inducements like IMF programs has at best a weak effect, but problem of reverse causality are possible.
主题Financial Economics ; Public Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w12049
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569702
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alberto Alesina,Silvia Ardagna,Francesco Trebbi. Who Adjusts and When? On the Political Economy of Reforms. 2006.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w12049.pdf(372KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Alberto Alesina]的文章
[Silvia Ardagna]的文章
[Francesco Trebbi]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Alberto Alesina]的文章
[Silvia Ardagna]的文章
[Francesco Trebbi]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Alberto Alesina]的文章
[Silvia Ardagna]的文章
[Francesco Trebbi]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w12049.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。