| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12050 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12050 |
| A Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance Reform | |
| Benjamin E. Hermalin; Michael S. Weisbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In light of recent corporate scandals, numerous proposals have been introduced for reforming corporate governance. This paper provides a theoretical framework through which to evaluate these reforms. Unlike various ad hoc arguments, this framework recognizes that governance structures arise endogenously in response to the constrained optimization problems faced by the relevant parties. Contract theory provides a set of necessary conditions under which governance reform can be welfare-improving: 1) There is asymmetric information at the time of contracting; or 2) Governance failures impose externalities on third parties; or 3) The state has access to remedies or punishments that are not available to third parties. We provide a series of models that illustrate the importance of these conditions and what can go wrong if they are not met. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12050 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569703 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin E. Hermalin,Michael S. Weisbach. A Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance Reform. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12050.pdf（228KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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