| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12051 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12051 |
| Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis | |
| Patrick Bajari; Stephanie Houghton; Steve Tadelis | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Procurement contracts are often incomplete because the initial plans and specifications are changed and refined after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost to the buyer that differs from the low bid, and may also involve significant adaptation and renegotiation costs. We propose a stylized model of bidding for incomplete contracts and apply it to data from highway paving contracts. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs, broadly defined, are an important determinant of the observed bids. We then estimate the costs of adaptation and bidder markups using a structural auction model. The estimates suggest that adaptation costs on average account for about ten percent of the winning bid. The distortions from private information and local market power, which are the focus on much of the literature on optimal procurement mechanisms, are much smaller by comparison. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12051 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569704 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bajari,Stephanie Houghton,Steve Tadelis. Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12051.pdf（715KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
