| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12107 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12107 |
| Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets | |
| Patrick Bolton; Jose Scheinkman; Wei Xiong | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12107 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569761 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bolton,Jose Scheinkman,Wei Xiong. Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12107.pdf（312KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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