| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12222 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12222 |
| Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms? | |
| Christian Leuz; Karl V. Lins; Francis E. Warnock | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-05-15 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand the factors that influence whether foreign outside investors provide capital to a country's firms. This study examines whether and why investor concern about corporate governance results in fewer foreign holdings. We use a comprehensive set of foreign holdings by U.S. investors as a proxy for foreign investment and analyze a sample of 4,411 firms from 29 emerging market and developed economies. We find that foreigners invest significantly less in firms that are poorly governed, i.e., firms that have ownership structures that are more conducive to outside investor expropriation. Interestingly, this finding is not simply a matter of a country's economic development but appears to be directly related to a country's information rules and legal institutions. We therefore argue that information problems faced by foreign investors play an important role in this result. Supporting this explanation, we show that foreign investment is lower in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; International Economics ; International Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12222 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569876 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Leuz,Karl V. Lins,Francis E. Warnock. Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12222.pdf（253KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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