| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w12225
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 12225
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| Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens |
| Joel Slemrod; John D. Wilson
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| 发表日期 | 2006-05-15
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries. The havens use real resources to help companies camouflage their home-country tax avoidance, and countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenues to the havens. The equilibrium price for this service depends on the demand and supply for such protection. Recognizing that taxes on wage income are also evaded, we solve for the equilibrium tax rates on mobile capital and immobile labor, and we demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries, in part because countries would be induced to increase their tax rates, which they have set at inefficiently low levels in an attempt to attract mobile capital. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolishment of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12225
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569879
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Joel Slemrod,John D. Wilson. Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens. 2006.
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文件名：
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w12225.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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