| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12286 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12286 |
| Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a Performance Accountability System | |
| Julie Berry Cullen; Randall Reback | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-06-12 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore the extent to which schools manipulate the composition of students in the test-taking pool in order to maximize ratings under Texas' accountability system in the 1990s. We first derive predictions from a static model of administrators' incentives given the structure of the ratings criteria, and then test these predictions by comparing differential changes in exemption rates across student subgroups within campuses and across campuses and regimes. Our analyses uncover evidence of a moderate degree of strategic behavior, so that there is some tension between designing systems that account for heterogeneity in student populations and that are manipulation-free. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12286 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/569940 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julie Berry Cullen,Randall Reback. Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a Performance Accountability System. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12286.pdf（274KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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