| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12399 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12399 |
| Renegotiation Without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions | |
| Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition%u2019s review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most countries. Hence, renegotiations allow incumbents to spend more without being subject to Congressional oversight. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12399 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570056 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo Engel,Ronald Fischer,Alexander Galetovic. Renegotiation Without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12399.pdf（169KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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