全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Signaling Credibility --- Choosing Optimal Debt and International Reserves

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w12407
来源ID	Working Paper 12407
	Signaling Credibility --- Choosing Optimal Debt and International Reserves
	Joshua Aizenman; Jorge Fernández-Ruiz
发表日期	2006-08-07
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	This paper evaluates the challenges facing developing countries when there is uncertainty about the policy maker type. We consider a country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs, and sovereign risk, where future output depends on the type of policymaker in place today. There are two policymakers -- type T chooses debt and international reserves to smooth tax collection costs; type S has higher discount factor, aiming at obtaining current resources for narrow interest groups, and preferring not to undertake costly reforms that may enhance future output. Financial markets do not know the type of policymaker in place and try to infer its type by looking at its financial choices. We show that various adverse shocks (lower output, higher real interest rate, etc.) can induce a switch from an equilibrium where each policy maker chooses its preferred policy to another where T distorts its policies in order to separate itself from S in the least costly way. This is accomplished by type T reducing both international reserves and external debt. Further decline in output would induce type T to lower debt, and reserves would fall at a higher rate than otherwise expected.
主题	International Economics ; International Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w12407
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570064
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Joshua Aizenman,Jorge Fernández-Ruiz. Signaling Credibility --- Choosing Optimal Debt and International Reserves. 2006.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w12407.pdf（167KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览