| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12430 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12430 |
| Employment and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance | |
| Jayanta Bhattacharya; William B. Vogt | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-08-15 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct and test a new model of employer-provided health insurance provision in the presence of adverse selection in the health insurance market. In our model, employers cannot observe the health of their employees, but can decide whether to offer insurance. Employees sort themselves among employers who do and do not offer insurance on the basis of their current health status and the probability distribution over future health status changes. We show that there exists a pooling equilibrium in which both sick and healthy employees are covered as long as the costs of job switching are higher than the persistence of health status. We test and verify some of the key implications of our model using data from the Current Population Survey, linked to information provided by the U.S. Department of Labor about the job-specific human capital requirements of jobs. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12430 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570088 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jayanta Bhattacharya,William B. Vogt. Employment and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12430.pdf（314KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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