| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w12445 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 12445 |
| Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis | |
| Patrick Bajari; Han Hong; Ahmed Khwaja | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-08-17 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy we find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12445 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570103 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bajari,Han Hong,Ahmed Khwaja. Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w12445.pdf（1377KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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