G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w12578
来源IDWorking Paper 12578
Optimal Liability for Terrorism
Darius Lakdawalla; Eric Talley
发表日期2006-10-13
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives, when the perpetrators of terrorism are unreachable by courts or regulators. We consider the strategic interaction among targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game-theoretic model. The model reveals that, while an "optimal" liability regime indeed exists, its features appear at odds with conventional legal templates. For example, it frequently prescribes damages payments from seemingly unlikely defendants, directing them to seemingly unlikely plaintiffs. The challenge of introducing such a regime using existing tort law doctrines, therefore, is likely to be prohibitive. Instead, we argue, efficient precaution incentives may be best provided by alternative policy mechanisms, such as a mutual public insurance pool for potential targets of terrorism, coupled with direct compensation to victims of terrorist attacks.
主题Other ; Law and Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w12578
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570239
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Darius Lakdawalla,Eric Talley. Optimal Liability for Terrorism. 2006.
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