| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w12578
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 12578
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| Optimal Liability for Terrorism |
| Darius Lakdawalla; Eric Talley
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| 发表日期 | 2006-10-13
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| 出版年 | 2006
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives, when the perpetrators of terrorism are unreachable by courts or regulators. We consider the strategic interaction among targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game-theoretic model. The model reveals that, while an "optimal" liability regime indeed exists, its features appear at odds with conventional legal templates. For example, it frequently prescribes damages payments from seemingly unlikely defendants, directing them to seemingly unlikely plaintiffs. The challenge of introducing such a regime using existing tort law doctrines, therefore, is likely to be prohibitive. Instead, we argue, efficient precaution incentives may be best provided by alternative policy mechanisms, such as a mutual public insurance pool for potential targets of terrorism, coupled with direct compensation to victims of terrorist attacks. |
| 主题 | Other
; Law and Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w12578
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/570239
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Darius Lakdawalla,Eric Talley. Optimal Liability for Terrorism. 2006.
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文件名：
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w12578.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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